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ABSTRACT
A considerable body of regulatory pronouncements attests to the significance of auditing journal entries for ensuring
that financial statements are free of material misstatements; however, existing empirical studies have paid insufficient
attention to the audit of journal entries. To explore this issue further, this paper proposes a model based on self-
organizing map as well as validates this model by performing experiments on a dataset containing journal entries.
Empirical results suggest that the proposed model can detect “suspicious” and legitimate transactions with a high degree
of accuracy. Further investigations reveal that the performance of the model is robust to varying prior probabilities of
“suspicious” journal entries occurring in the population. The findings indicate that the model can assist auditors in
detecting “suspicious” journal entries.
Keywords
Auditing, journal entries, self-organizing map
INTRODUCTION
Auditing journal entries has gained prominence as a result of statute and auditing standards that have been promulgated
in the wake of financial malfeasance (e.g. Enron, WorldCom) in order to protect investors. In essence, Sarbanes and
Oxley Act (U.S. Congress, 2002) Sections 302 and 404 require the management of companies to establish and maintain
internal controls as well as to assess the effectiveness of these controls at the end of a fiscal year; and, Auditing Standard
No.5 (Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), 2007) requires external auditors to give an opinion on
the effectiveness of a company’s internal controls. Further, auditors are required to test the appropriateness of journal
entries recorded in the general ledger and other adjustments made in preparing financial statements in order to obtain
reasonable assurance about whether the financial statements are free of material misstatements, whether caused by
errors or fraud (PCAOB, 2002). In addition, the Standing Advisory Group (PCAOB, 2004) considers “. . . significant
or unusual journal entries . . . ” to be an area that poses a high risk of material misstatement due to fraud. Auditors may
be exposed to litigation (Palmrose, 1991) and subject to regulatory enforcement releases (Bonner et al., 1998), if they
fail to detect material misstatements to financial statements. However, absent a single study by Debreceny and Gray
(2010), existing literature has paid little attention to the audit of journal entries; indeed, literature acknowledges the
paucity of empirical studies in this area (Hogan et al., 2008).
This paper proposes and then validates a model in order to assist auditors in detecting “suspicious” journal entries. To
this end, the paper adopts an one-class classification approach (Chandola et al., 2009; Juszczak et al., 2008), because, in
an audit engagement, a dataset does not contain journal entries that are pre-labelled as “suspicious” nor as legitimate. As
a result, detecting “suspicious” journal entries can be achieved only with reference to information describing legitimate
journal entries. The implicit assumption being the vast majority of journal entries are legitimate and generated by a
probability distribution that is different form that generating “suspicious” journal entries. Given this assumption, the
paper employs self-organizing map (SOM; Kohonen, 1997), an unsupervised-learning algorithm, to derive a reference
model that can describe the behaviour of legitimate journal entries. The paper compares novel journal entries against
the reference model to determine whether they are “suspicious” or legitimate; it does so by calculating the quantization
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error, a distance metric, between individual journal entries and the SOM-based reference model. A journal entry having
a quantization error that exceeds a specified threshold is deemed to be “suspicious”.
To validate the proposed SOM-based model, the paper conducts a series of experiments on a dataset that has been
made available by an international shipping company, and contains the complete set of their journal entries for fiscal
year 2006. The paper incorporates certain characteristics of an audit engagement in order to carry out as realistic
experiments as possible. First, it simulates four categories of potential errors that may affect a journal entry; the
number of categories is restricted by the number of variables describing a journal entry. Second, it considers three
prior probabilities, or prevalence, of “suspicious” journal entries occurring in the population, because the number of
“suspicious” journal entries is likely to be orders of magnitude smaller than that of legitimate. Third, it examines
four cost-ratios of Type I and Type II errors, as in an audit engagement the cost of a Type II error, identifying a
“suspicious” journal entry as legitimate, tends to be much higher than that of a Type I error, identifying a legitimate
journal entry as “suspicious”. Fourth, the paper initialises a range of thresholds and selects that which minimises the
total misclassification cost as the optimum threshold.
In the following section, the paper reviews related studies; subsequently, it describes the data, introduces SOM and the
reference model as well as elaborates on the simulation of “suspicious” journal entries and the experiments. Further,
the paper presents and discusses the results, and then provides conclusions and suggests directions for additional
research.
BACKGROUND AND RELATED STUDIES
The Statement On Auditing Standards 99 (SAS 99): Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit (AICPA,
2002), which is the interim standard AU Section 316 of PCAOB, requires an auditor to obtain reasonable assurance
that financial statements are free of material misstatements, whether caused by error or fraud. Further, AU Section
316 0.58 requires an auditor, among other things, to test the appropriateness of journal entries recorded in the general
ledger as well as other adjustments made in preparing financial statements. The reason is management can misstate
financial statements by recording fictitious and inappropriate journal entries, especially towards the end of a fiscal year
(AU Section 316 .08, and .58). Financial statement fraud entails considerable legal and economic costs for companies,
directors, and shareholders (COSO, 2010) as well as may expose auditors to litigation (Palmrose, 1991).
A research synthesis of the literature pertinent to financial statement fraud acknowledges the lack of empirical studies
that address the relationship between unusual or top-level journal entries and financial statement fraud (Hogan et al.,
2008). In order to test journal entries for detecting fraud, Debreceny and Gray (2010) have applied digit analysis or
Benford’s Law to a set of journal entries that were obtained from 27 organizations across different industry types and
sizes. In brief, the paper compares the observed distribution of the first digit of US$ amounts against that expected by
Benford’s Law; and if the difference is statistically significant under a chi-square test, then the US$ amount is deemed
to be suspicious. The results have suggested that for all organizations the observed distribution of the first digit of US$
amounts were significantly different form that expected by Benford’s Law. However, the results may be an artefact
of the chi-square test, as a large number of observations can induce statistically significant results (Grabski, 2010).
A further explanation is that either fraudulent journal entries were the norm in the sample, or Benford’s Law is not
applicable to journal entries (Grabski, 2010).
The self-organizing map has been applied to detect “anomalous” behaviour in a number of diverse domains where
information describing this type of behaviour does not exist in advance, or is rare, or expensive to collect; as a result,
detecting “anomalous” behaviour can be based only on information describing “legitimate” behaviour. For example,
SOM has been used to detect fraudulent insurance claims (Brockett et al., 1998), to develop risk-adjustment models
for estimating medical expenditures (Hsu et al., 2008), and detect fraudulent credit-card transactions (Juszczak et al.,
2008).
Further, Ypma and Duin (1997) has detected faults in rotating mechanical machinery and leaks in pipelines by using a
variant of the SOM-based metric proposed by Kaski and Lagus (1996). SOM has been used as an intrusion detection
tool for detecting “ anomalous” network traffic (e.g. TCP/IP packets) that may signal a possible Denial of Service
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attack (Labib and Vemuri, 2002), detecting instances of buffer-overflow attacks based on a model of legitimate network
traffic (Rhodes et al., 2000), and identifying “anomalous” behaviour that may exist in network services (e.g. web,
e-mail, telnet) (Ramadas et al., 2003).
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
Data description
The raw data have been provided by an international shipping company in the form of a text-file containing the complete
set of their journal entries, n = 6,404, for fiscal year 2006. The text-file consists of 25,422 lines and eight columns,
representing accounting transactions and variables, respectively. The number of accounting transactions is greater than
that of journal entries, because a journal entry can be made up of any number of transactions as long as the “Debit”
and “Credit” sides are equal. The eight variables are as follows: (i) “Account Number” (alphanumerical), (ii) “Account
Name” (text), (iii) “Posting Date” (date), (iv) “US$ amount” (numerical), (v) “Debit-Credit Indicator” (binary), (vi)
“Description” (text), (vii) “Account Class” (hierarchical), and (viii) “Code” (numerical); the types of the variables are
shown in parentheses.
The paper uses the individual accounting transactions as the unit of analysis and the following three variables: (i) “US$
amount”, (ii) “Debit-Credit Indicator”, and (iii) “Code”. The paper aggregates the transactions at the “Account Class”
level (n = 27), because there are not enough transactions at the “Account Number” level (n = 360) for the paper to
perform statistical analyses, nor to draw meaningful conclusions. Descriptive statistics are shown in Table 1.
Self-organizing map
SOM performs two operations: first, it performs vector-quantization by representing input vectors with a much smaller,
albeit representative, set of codevectors; and second, it carries out a non-linear mapping or projection from a high-
dimensional input space to a regular two-dimensional grid of neurons, while preserving the original topology as faith-
fully as possible. For the purpose of this study, SOM is employed to perform only vector-quantization.
In the context of this study, the input dataset to SOM is denoted by X = (~xi j)nd, where n = 25,422 represents the number
of transactions, and d = 3 denotes the dimensionality of the dataset. Given this input dataset, SOM constructs a set of
codevectors, M = (~mk j)Kd, where d = 3 as above, and k = 1,2,3, . . . ,810 denotes the number of codevectors, which is
approximately equal to 5 x
√
25,422 (Vesanto et al., 2000, p.30); the size of the SOM grid is set to 30 rows and 27
columns. A neuron k is described by a tuple (~mk, ~pk), where ~mk ∈ R3 is a codevector and ~pk ∈ R2 is a location vector
on the SOM grid.
SOM is formed in three iterative processes. First, in the competition process, each input vector, ~xi ∈ R3, is compared
with all codevectors, ~mk ∈ R3, and the best match in terms of the smallest Euclidean distance, ‖ ~xi − ~mk ‖, is mapped
onto neuron k, termed the best-matching unit (i.e. BMU), and denoted by the subscript c: ‖ ~xi− ~mc ‖= min
k
{
‖ ~xi− ~mk ‖
}
(Kohonen, 1997, p.86).
Second, in the co-operation process, the BMU locates the centre of a neighbourhood kernel, hck(t), which is usually a






, where ~pc, ~pk ∈ R2 are the location vectors of BMU and neuron
k respectively, t denotes discrete time, and σ (t) defines the width of the kernel (Kohonen, 1997, p.87).





, where 0 < a(t) 6 1 is a learning rate at discrete time t, and a(t) is a non-increasing
function of time. Batch-training SOM updates the codevectors only at the end of each epoch, which is a complete





Finally, SOM converges to a stable state when the codevectors do not get updated any further; the convergence criterion
is E{hck(~xi− limt→∞ ~mk(t))} = 0, where E{.} denotes the expectation function (Kohonen, 1997, p.113).
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Interquartile range
Account Class Code N Mean MAD(*) 0.75 0.25
Property, Plants and Equipment: Costs 1000 25 13,202 913 982 -526
Property, Plants and Equipment: Depr. 1100 61 -3,302 386 -98 -1,139
Investments in Subsidiaries 1200 3 11,750 9,800 21,413 2,550
Cash in Bank 2110 3,744 1,800 4,913 13,983 -247
Cash at Hand 2140 259 13 84 39 -113
Sales Taxes Receivable 2170 812 69 8 42 3
Trade Debtors 2200 3,989 -1,725 4,037 1,725 -8,812
Other Trade Debtors 2204 1,048 538 1,549 1,566 -1,495
Accounts Receivable 2207 309 0 36 7 -60
Short-term Loans Receivable 2300 14 1,582,003 110,434 2,500,000 -5,000
Insurance Receivable 2400 4,963 -86 1,869 1,843 -2,000
Other Debtors and Receivables 2600 177 1,046 979 762 -1,302
Accounts Payable 3455 3,242 -75 296 112 -546
Trade Creditors 3480 1,107 -4,542 1,743 -135 -6,165
Other Income Received 6000 19 -12,671 186 -139 -430
Fees Received 6100 36 -13,333 15,000 -1,500 -28,500
Insurance Commission Received 6260 1,996 -805 332 -89 -1,125
Bank Interest Received 6300 344 -1,307 712 -215 -2,367
Other Interest Received 6305 8 -145,875 10,238 -130,668 -153,653
Exchange Difference: Gain 6440 678 -788 18 1 -42
Administration Expenses 8500 1,236 65 57 114 -6
Office Expenses 8501 466 222 176 332 -54
Salaries and Wages 8550 214 3,034 4,372 7,392 -2,516
Fees and Commissions 8600 121 817 107 592 17
Professional Expenses 8610 28 3,440 583 1,757 -52
Finance Expenses 8700 465 158 14 36 10
Depreciation Expenses 8800 58 941 388 1,139 165
25,422
(*) Median absolute difference. Amounts are expressed in US$.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Reference model
The set of stable-state codevectors, M = (~mk j)Kd, can function as the reference model of input data, because the proba-
bility density function of the codevectors approximates that of input data (Kohonen, 1999, 1997, p.48). The reference
model thus derived enjoys a number of properties that can enhance its application. First, it does not make any as-
sumptions concerning the probability distribution of the transactions, as the codevectors are essentially non-parametric
regressors of the transactions. Second, it is robust to changes to input data, because all the pertinent operations (e.g.
calculating distances) are performed in the input space; and thus any changes in the input data would propagate cor-
responding changes to the estimation and update of codevectors. Third, it is derived directly from the data, and hence
does not entail encoding domain-expert knowledge, as the case would have been had the paper adopted a model-driven
approach. Fourth, the paper can detect transactions deviating from the reference model without having to form expec-
tations about these transactions in advance. Fifth, the computational complexity of the model scales well with large
datasets, because the number of codevectors is often chosen to be approximately equal to the square root of the number
of input vectors, K ≈
√
n.
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The paper assesses the degree of affinity between the reference model and a transaction by calculating the quantization
error: Ri =‖ ~xi − ~mc ‖2; it represents the Euclidean distance between the ith transaction, ~xi, and the codevector corre-
sponding to its BMU, ~mc. This scoring mechanism is feasible and valid, because quantization error is monotonically
related to the degree of “suspiciousness” (Bolton and Hand, 2002). The larger a transaction’s quantization error is, the
farther away from the reference model this transaction is going to be, and hence the more likely it could be “suspi-
cious”. An equivalent interpretation is transactions having quantization errors that exceed a specified threshold, and
hence are considered to be “suspicious”, are generated by a probability distribution that is different from that generating
legitimate transactions.
Simulating “suspicious” transactions
To represent an audit engagement as faithfully as possible, the paper addresses the following four issues: (i) categories
of potential errors that may affect a transaction, (ii) prior probability, or prevalence, of “suspicious” transactions oc-
curring in the population, (iii) asymmetrical misclassification costs of Type I and Type II errors, and (iv) optimum
threshold that can distinguish “suspicious” from legitimate transactions.
Four categories of potential errors
In the present case, a transaction is described by three variables and can be considered as “suspicious” if either of these
variables contain an error given the rest are error-free, or all of the variables contain errors. This combination yields
four categories of potential errors that may affect a transaction. The paper assumes that the four categories occur with
an equal probability.
In order to simulate errors in “US$ amount”, the paper adds a noise to this variable; this noise is equal to the average
of median-absolute-difference of an “Account Class” that is selected randomly excluding the “Account Class” of the
transactions whose “US$ amount” are to be modified. Second, to simulate errors in “Debit - Credit Indicator”, the
paper reverses the binary indicator, {1,0}, thereby changing “Debit”, denoted by 1, to “Credit”, denoted by 0, and vice
versa. This operation is equivalent to multiplying the “US$ amount” by (−1), thus converting positive amounts, Debit
balances, to negative amounts, Credit balances, and conversely. Third, the paper replaces the value of “Account Class”
by a different value selected randomly; and the combination of the foregoing three categories forms the fourth category
of potential errors.
Prior probabilities
The paper investigates the following three prior probabilities of “suspicious” transactions : p1 = 5%, p2 = 3%, and
p3 = 1%. For each of the three probabilities, the paper sets up a dataset that contains both legitimate transactions,
selected randomly from the input dataset, and simulated “suspicious” transactions that are seeded according to the
foregoing probabilities; the paper elaborates on this procedure in the section describing the experiments.
Asymmetrical misclassification costs
The model produces a binary output, T ∈ {1,0}, where 1 and 0 denote “suspicious” and legitimate transactions, respec-
tively; and similarly, D ∈ {1,0} represents the actual classes of transactions. The model can make two types of errors:
(i) Type I, or false positive, when it identifies a legitimate transaction as “suspicious”, and (ii) Type II, or false negative,
when it fails to identify a “suspicious” transaction as such. Table 2 describes the two types of errors, the two correct
outcomes, and their respective costs; for example, Cs/l and Cl/s represent the costs of false negative and false posi-
tive, respectively. The paper assumes that no costs are incurred in identifying “suspicious” and legitimate transactions
correctly (i.e. Cs/s = Cl/l = 0). Although actual costs may be difficult to estimate, in an audit engagement the cost of
false negative, Cs/l, tends to be much higher than that of false positive, Cl/s. Consequently, the paper investigates the
following four cost-ratios, r = Cl/s/Cs/l: 1:1, 1:10, 1:20, and 1:30.
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Model
Actual suspicious (1) legitimate (0)
suspicious (1) true positive false negative
Cs/s Cs/l
legitimate (0) false positive true negative
Cl/s Cl/l
Table 2: Classification and cost matrix
Optimum threshold
In order to estimate the optimum threshold, the paper minimises the total misclassification cost that is calculated as
follows:
C = Cl/s P(T = 1|D = 0) P(D = 0) + Cs/l P(T = 0|D = 1) P(D = 1). (1)
Where P(T = 1|D = 0), the false positive rate, denotes the probability that the model identifies a transaction as “sus-
picious”, given that it is legitimate; P(T = 0|D = 1), the false negative rate, represents the probability that the model
identifies a transaction as legitimate, given that it is “suspicious”; P(D = 1) represents the prior probability of “sus-
picious” transactions occurring in the population; and, by definition, P(D = 0) = 1− P(D = 1) represents the prior
probability of legitimate transactions.
The model’s binary output, T ∈ {1,0}, can be expressed as: Ti =
{
1, Ri ≥ u
0, otherwise . Where u is a threshold, Ri =‖ ~xi− ~mc ‖
2
represents the “ suspiciousness” score the model estimates for each transaction, and i = 1,2, . . . ,25,422 denotes the
transactions. A range of thresholds is initialised, and that which minimises the total misclassification cost, Equation 1,
is declared to be the optimum threshold.
Experiments
The paper conducts the experiments in five steps depicted as an input-process-output diagram in Figure 1. First, it
uses bootstrap, B = 100, to select one hundred random samples with replacement from the empirical distribution of
the input dataset, X = (~xi j)nd. Second, for each bootstrap dataset (i.e. X1, . . . ,X100), the paper simulates and then





p3 denote the three datasets that correspond to the first bootstrap dataset (i.e. X
1) and contain simulated
“suspicious” transactions in the order of 5%,3%, and 1%, respectively. Third, for each bootstrap dataset, the paper
uses SOM-toolbox for Matlab (Vesanto et al., 2000) to train a SOM in batch mode with hexagonal grid of neurons and
Gaussian neighbourhood. Each SOM produces a set of codevectors that constitutes the reference model describing the
legitimate behaviour of the corresponding bootstrap dataset. For example, M2 = (~mk j)Kd forms the reference model
of dataset X2 = (~xi j)nd, where K = 810 denoting the number of neurons and that of codevectors, n = 25,422 reflecting
the number of transactions, and d = 3 representing the dimensionality of input dataset. It is worth repeating that
the paper trains SOMs on the bootstrap datasets that contain only legitimate transactions, and consequently the sets
of codevectors do not include any information concerning “suspicious” transactions. In the fourth step, the paper
applies the sets of codevectors, derived in the preceding training step, on the datasets containing both legitimate and
simulated “suspicious” transactions in order to calculate the quantisation error, Rbi =‖ ~y i
b− ~m bc ‖
2; this error represents
the “suspiciousness” score of each transaction. Fifth, the paper initialises a range of candidate thresholds, and that
which minimises the total misclassification cost, Equation 1, is chosen to be the optimum threshold.
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Simulate and seed errors SOM:Training step
Datasets: Suspicious and 
legitimate transactions SOM: Testing step Reference Models
Optimise threshold
Figure 1: An input-process-output representation of the experiments
RESULTS PRESENTATION AND DISCUSSION
To recapitulate, the paper proposes and validates via experiments a SOM-based model in order to detect “suspicious”
transactions. To conduct the experiments, the paper considers twelve scenarios by combining three prior probabilities
of “suspicious” transactions and four cost-ratios of Type I and Type II errors. For each scenario, the paper addresses
four categories of potential errors that may affect a transaction and performs one hundred experiments by using boot-
strap.
Cost True Negative Rate True Positive Rate
Prior Ratios Mean Stdev Mean Stdev
95% C.I 95% C.I 95% C.I 95% C.I
5%
1:1 0.957 0.954 0.960 0.015 0.013 0.019 0.820 0.788 0.847 0.151 0.131 0.176
1:10 0.910 0.861 0.938 0.185 0.102 0.281 0.883 0.854 0.907 0.130 0.105 0.158
1:20 0.898 0.840 0.927 0.211 0.139 0.311 0.889 0.859 0.911 0.130 0.104 0.156
1:30 0.897 0.844 0.930 0.211 0.136 0.299 0.891 0.859 0.912 0.130 0.108 0.163
3%
1:1 0.953 0.940 0.959 0.041 0.019 0.079 0.881 0.843 0.908 0.168 0.136 0.207
1:10 0.914 0.876 0.938 0.149 0.087 0.248 0.936 0.907 0.955 0.116 0.086 0.159
1:20 0.893 0.836 0.920 0.191 0.124 0.278 0.945 0.918 0.963 0.111 0.073 0.153
1:30 0.885 0.831 0.916 0.206 0.136 0.290 0.946 0.919 0.964 0.111 0.075 0.159
1%
1:1 0.962 0.959 0.965 0.016 0.013 0.020 0.812 0.781 0.840 0.149 0.136 0.172
1:10 0.917 0.871 0.943 0.181 0.099 0.271 0.860 0.830 0.885 0.148 0.128 0.177
1:20 0.905 0.849 0.937 0.204 0.137 0.298 0.862 0.834 0.889 0.147 0.127 0.178
1:30 0.897 0.840 0.931 0.216 0.137 0.298 0.862 0.829 0.890 0.148 0.127 0.177
Table 3: Statistical analyses of results
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The results are depicted in Table 3; each line corresponds to a scenario and represents the outcome of one hundred
experiments. For example, the second line describes the performance of the model when the prior probability of
“suspicious” transactions is 5% and the cost of a Type II error is 10 times that of a Type I error. In this scenario, the
model can detect on average 91% (C.I0.95 = 0.861−0.938) of the legitimate transactions as being legitimate as well as
88.3% (C.I0.95 = 0.854−0.907) of the “suspicious” transactions as being “suspicious”; the respective 95% confidence
intervals are shown in parentheses.
A closer examination of the results reveals that within each of the three prior probabilities, as the cost of Type II error
increases relative to that of Type I error, the mean true positive rate increases, whereas the mean true negative rate
decreases. This pattern is expected, because a more costly Type II error would shift the threshold, optimised according
to Equation 1, in favour of the model identifying more transactions as “suspicious”. Consequently, the true positive
rate would be higher, albeit only at the expense of a higher false positive rate.
To analyse further the performance of the proposed model, the paper presents in Figure 2 the averaged Receiver
Operating Characteristic Curve (i.e. ROC curve) that corresponds to the four scenarios using a 5% prior probability of
“suspicious” transactions. In brief, the ROC curve plots the model’s true positive rate (y-axis), or sensitivity, against
the false positive rate (x-axis), or 1 - specificity. The ascending diagonal stands for the random or non-informative
classifier, and any classifier that appears below this diagonal performs worse than chance. Further, points (0,0) and
(1,1) represent classifiers that identify all transactions as “suspicious” and as legitimate, respectively; whereas, point
(0,1) marks the perfect classifier that can identify all “suspicious” and legitimate transactions correctly. The area under
the ROC curve, AUROC = 0.975, denotes the probability with which the model can identify correctly random pairs of
legitimate and “suspicious” transactions, and thus it summarises the discriminatory qualities of the model (Hanley and
McNeil, 1982).





















Receiver Opearating Characteristic Curve
← (0.0256, 0.7798) [1:1]
← (0.0635, 0.9567) [1:30]
Ratiosegment = 0.906
(False positive rate, True positive rate) [Type I:Type II costs] AUROC = 0.975
Figure 2: Averaged ROC curve for the four scenarios using a 5% probability of “suspicious” transactions
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The presence of asymmetrical misclassification costs induces different operating points on the ROC curve that identify
different trade-offs between true positive and false positive rates. For example, the operating points (0.0635, 0.9567)
and (0.0256, 0.7798) minimise the total misclassification cost, Equation 1, when the cost-ratios of Type I and Type
II errors are 1:30 and 1:1, respectively. The uncertainty about cost-ratios can be incorporated in the ROC curve by
considering the range the two operating points delineate. The area corresponding to this range can function as a
measure of the model’s performance that is more robust than the AUROC, because only this segment of the ROC
curve is useful for decision making. In a process analogous to estimating the AUROC, the paper defines Ratiosegment
as the ratio of the area under the segment of ROC curve that is of interest to the area of the corresponding rectangle
of unit length. The model exhibits a Ratiosegment = 0.906, whereas, by definition, the perfect classifier would have
Ratiosegment = 1.
CONCLUSIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
This paper proposes a SOM-based model for detecting “suspicious” journal entries. While statute and auditing stan-
dards require auditors to consider the complete set of journal entries in planning and performing audits, existing
literature, absent a single study (Debreceny and Gray, 2010), has paid insufficient attention to the audit of journal
entries.
Empirical analyses suggest that the proposed model enjoys a high true positive rate in detecting “suspicious” journal
entries. Further investigations reveal that the performance of the model is robust to varying prior probabilities of
“suspicious” journal entries occurring in a population as well as to asymmetrical misclassification costs of Type I and
Type II errors. These findings allow the paper to infer that the model can be generalised to datasets beyond the present
case. As a result, the model can have a practical application in the domain of accounting in that it can aid auditors to
detect “suspicious” journal entries.
Ongoing research aims at developing a probabilistic model that can assign a probability, rather than a score, to a
journal entry. This probability would indicate the degree to which a journal entry is considered to be “suspicious”, and
be updated by using Bayesian analysis, given different estimates of audit risks. An additional line of research could
be examining whether the model can detect “suspicious” journal entries auditors fail to do so. A further focal point of
research could be coding and implementing the model in a database environment.
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